When one party to the war calls for dialogue: Who will dialogue with Al-Burhan?

For more than three years, Sudan has been living through one of its worst tragedies. Cities have been destroyed, families displaced, millions uprooted and forced into refuge, thousands have lost their lives, and wealth has been looted — and still, the voice of war remains louder than the voice of reason. And in the midst of all this, Al-Burhan steps forward to call for a comprehensive Sudanese dialogue.

Frankly, the question we should be asking is not: Are we for or against dialogue?

We all want dialogue. We all want peace.

But the real question is: When one of the warring parties calls for dialogue, who will actually dialogue with him? Under what conditions? And who will decide who participates and who is excluded?

These are not side questions — they are the very essence of the matter.

No one can say that Sudan does not need dialogue. Sudan needs genuine dialogue more than ever. But the dialogue we need is not a dialogue managed from above by a de facto authority, nor a conference where political forces are selected based on their proximity to or distance from power, only for us to emerge at the end and declare that we have held a national dialogue.

True national dialogue must be independent of the warring parties, and it must include the Sudanese who have paid the price of this war — not just politicians looking for new seats around the table of power.

And here we must return to the reality that some are trying to overlook.

Al-Burhan is not an observer of the war, nor is he a mediator between two sides. He is the commander of the army and the head of the ruling authority in part of Sudan — not all of it. He was at the heart of the political scene before the war and during it, just as he was at the head of the authority that staged a coup against the transitional path in October 2021.

That is to say, he is part of the political crisis that preceded the war and part of the military scene that is managing the war today.

Therefore, when he calls for dialogue, his call cannot be treated as if it came from a neutral mediator.

He is one party inviting the other parties to dialogue.

And here the real question begins.

One of the most important things we must pay attention to in any political dialogue is not just the words spoken inside it, but who sits around the table and who is left outside.

Because the most dangerous thing that could happen is that a dialogue is built to fit the size of power, and then the people are asked to believe that its outcomes represent all of Sudan.

A dialogue whose participants are pre-selected is not a national dialogue — it is a political process designed to produce a predetermined outcome.

And here we arrive at the most sensitive question:

This is a very dangerous point.

The state must not become a person, nor the army a political party, nor war a means of producing new legitimacy for a clique trying to rule Sudan in the name of the state.

Legitimacy does not come from controlling institutions or from winning a battle.

And it is not necessarily true that every force that sits in the dialogue represents the people just because it is a political force.

Today, Sudan's political forces face a real test.

Participating in any dialogue is not a crime, just as refusing dialogue is not an act of heroism in itself.

The question is: On what terms do we participate?

If civil forces enter the dialogue already knowing that its agenda is fixed, that participants have been chosen according to their positions toward power, that the war is ongoing, and that there are no real guarantees for the independence of the process — then they may be transformed from partners in peacemaking into merely a civilian cover for a political process forged by war.

And here, civil forces must be more cautious than ever.

We do not need to go to dialogue to prove that we are for peace.

We are for peace.

But we want a peace that returns power to the people — not a peace that rearranges power among the forces that caused the crisis.

Because the problem in Sudan is not just about individuals.

The problem is in the way the state itself is managed.

A state controlled by the military, where militias are used, where politics is conducted through force — and then each party comes at the end to seek political legitimacy for what it has imposed by arms.

If the proposed dialogue leads to that outcome, then what has changed?

We will have only changed the names of those sitting around the table.

But the system itself will remain.

And Sudan does not need a change of faces.

Sudan needs a change in the rules of the game.

We need a democratic civil state, a single professional army under civilian authority, institutions that are not subject to individuals, and justice that is not bargained away whenever politicians need a settlement.

But the question will remain:

These are the questions that must precede any talk of dialogue.

Because Sudan is not the property of Al-Burhan, nor the property of any party, movement, or armed force.

Sudan belongs to its people.

And a dialogue that does not return that right to the people — no matter how many participants it has, no matter how grand the hall — will not be a dialogue for Sudan.

It will only be a dialogue about who will own Sudan after the war.