When War Outpaces Sanctions

As 9 October draws near — the date the current sanctions regime on Sudan is due to expire — we're facing a question that goes far beyond simply extending or amending these measures. It's about whether sanctions still fit a war that has evolved so much since they were first introduced.

Sudan has changed drastically since the UN Security Council imposed an arms embargo on Darfur back in 2004. What began there has grown into a broader conflict spanning regions across the country — fought with aircraft, drones, and advanced weaponry that have become central to how this war is waged.

Yet the Security Council's arms embargo remains tied only to Darfur. The same goes for the ban on offensive military flights by the Sudanese government.

This gap between the reach of sanctions and the reality of the war is no longer just a technical concern.

If weapons are reaching both warring parties and being used across wide areas of Sudan — if airstrikes and drone attacks are hitting cities and regions far beyond Darfur — it is genuinely hard to see why one of our most powerful tools of international pressure remains confined to a single region.

This is not about punishing Sudan or favouring one side over another. It is about making sure the rules designed to protect civilians align with the reality civilians are actually living every day.

Recent reports on drone use show just how much the nature of this war has shifted. Both sides now rely heavily on drones; the UN recorded more than a thousand deaths from drone strikes in just the first five months of 2026. And attacks are now striking populated areas and civilian infrastructure far beyond any traditional battlefront.

So the question is straightforward: if the methods of war have changed and the battlefields have grown — why have the measures meant to stop weapons flowing to these areas not changed too?

There is another reason this review cannot wait.

Reports and investigations have emerged suggesting chemical weapons may have been used in Sudan — with evidence and witness accounts that experts say deserve a full international inquiry. These claims must not be treated as proven before an independent investigation takes place, and the Sudanese government has denied them. But the seriousness of the allegations and the evidence cited means the OPCW and the international community must take this seriously and ensure an independent, transparent investigation goes ahead.

Chemical weapons are not just another weapon in this conflict. When credible evidence or reports point to their possible use, the danger to civilians rises — and the need to regulate how war is waged becomes even more urgent.

This is where the issue of weapons meets the use of aircraft and drones.

If long-range strike capability is becoming more widespread, and if there are reports of banned weapons being used, then keeping flight restrictions limited to one narrow area simply needs to be reconsidered. That does not mean expanding sanctions will alone end the war. It will not.

But sanctions are one tool the Security Council has to curb the flow of arms, equipment, and technology that allows both sides to sustain the fighting.

So extending the arms embargo to cover the whole of Sudan should not be seen merely as a legal adjustment — it must be seen as a response to the actual geography of the war itself.

The same applies to restrictions on military flights. If our goal is to protect civilians, that protection should not be tied to boundaries that no longer reflect where the war is actually happening.

Yet wider sanctions are not enough on their own. Enforcement matters too.

Weapons do not arrive in Sudan by themselves. There are supply networks, financing, and outside actors — including states — keeping arms, technology, and fighters flowing in.

So the question is not just: Should we expand sanctions?

We must also ask:

The people of Sudan do not need sanctions just so the international community looks like it is acting. They need measures that match the reality of the war they are living through.

Darfur still needs protection — deeply so. But protecting Darfur should not mean leaving the rest of Sudan without that same protection.

If the war has spread beyond Darfur, and if weapons and drones can now reach civilians across the country, then the tools available to the Security Council must keep pace with that reality.

The real question, then, is not whether sanctions should be kept or lifted.

It is whether sanctions in their current form still reflect the war being fought in Sudan today — and the civilians caught up in it.